Iran Israel conflict intensifies with drone strike and fragile twelve day war

USPA NEWS - Renewed Fire Over the Middle East

On 7 September 2025, a drone launched from territory controlled by the Houthis in Yemen struck the entrance hall of Ramon Airport near Eilat. The incident caused only one minor injury, but flights were suspended for several hours and the airspace of southern Israel was placed on alert. The attack appeared limited, yet its significance extended far beyond the immediate damage. For Israel, a drone traveling thousands of kilometers to reach a civilian airport was not merely a tactical instrument but evidence of a regional network constructed over decades by Tehran.

The Houthis, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed groups in Gaza and Iraq, form part of what the Islamic Republic calls the Axis of Resistance: a web of proxies whose primary mission is the permanent threat to Israel. Just three months earlier, in June 2025, Israel had struck directly at Iranian military and nuclear facilities for the first time. Tehran responded with more than 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 suicide drones. Although many were intercepted by Israeli defenses, dozens penetrated, causing casualties and damage. The confrontation—later known as the Twelve Day War—ended under a fragile ceasefire brokered by the United States and Qatar. Neither side admitted defeat; each claimed deterrence, each claimed proof of strength.

From Shadow War to Open Confrontation

The Houthi strike on Ramon Airport demonstrated that the ceasefire was nothing more than a pause. The underlying conflict persists in new forms. The shadow war of assassinations, cyberattacks, and covert operations has given way to open confrontation. The first direct clash in June proved that former red lines no longer exist, and the prospect of renewed fighting on a larger scale remains entirely real.

Ideological Roots of the Islamic Republic

The 1979 revolution in Iran not only ended a monarchy and established a religious republic but also redefined regional policy around absolute hostility toward Israel. The new leadership quickly erased the Israeli presence, closing its embassy and handing the building to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Streets and squares were renamed after Palestinian fighters, and state media repeated slogans of Israel’s destruction day and night. These acts became pillars of regime identity rather than temporary measures.

In the rhetoric of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Israel was not a normal state. He labeled it a “cancerous tumor” that must be eradicated. The same phrase has been echoed for decades by Ali Khamenei and commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, framing enmity with Israel as a religious and revolutionary duty beyond conventional geopolitics.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was created not only to defend Iran but also to export the revolution and support armed movements against Israel. Billions of dollars were funneled to build Hezbollah during Lebanon’s civil war, transforming it into one of the strongest nonstate forces in the region, openly declaring itself Iran’s arm in the battle against Israel.
In Gaza, Iran recognized Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as partners rejecting Israel’s existence. Financial aid, training, and missile technology expanded their capacity—not to secure peace but to guarantee continuous conflict. For parts of the Shiite ideological narrative close to the leadership, the return of the Twelfth Imam is linked to a great war against Israel. This belief elevates hostility from strategy to destiny, turning conflict into a perceived historical necessity.

This worldview has been institutionalized. Iranian children study textbooks portraying Israel as the absolute enemy. State television broadcasts anti-Israeli messages daily. Friday prayers end with chants of “Death to Israel.” Military parades display missiles labeled with the names of Israeli cities. Such constant propaganda embeds enmity into cultural habit.

Enmity also serves internal functions. During economic crises or waves of protest, the regime amplifies the external threat to divert public attention. In practice, Israel operates as a permanent enemy: both for domestic mobilization and justification of foreign interventions. Abandoning this line is impossible without undermining the regime’s legitimacy. Khamenei has repeatedly declared that Israel will not survive more than 25 years—a statement appearing on posters and walls, symbolizing that Israel’s destruction is considered a strategic objective.

The IRGC, especially the Quds Force, has translated this ideology into action by transferring missile technology to Gaza, arming Hezbollah with tens of thousands of rockets, and building militias in Iraq and Syria. Through this network, Iran has tightened the circle of threat around Israel and reinforced the permanence of confrontation.

Regional Proxies as Instruments of Power

The Islamic Republic has distinguished itself by transforming ideology into operational architecture. Over four decades, it has constructed a complex network of armed groups across the Middle East, officially referred to as the Axis of Resistance. This network forms the backbone of Iran’s strategy to apply pressure on Israel while simultaneously expanding regional influence.

Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most significant element of this network. Established in the 1980s with direct Iranian support, it has evolved from a militia into a fully fledged army. Today it possesses tens of thousands of rockets capable of striking the entirety of Israel. Continuous financial aid, training, and advanced weaponry from Iran have strengthened Hezbollah, granting Tehran both political leverage in Beirut and a powerful military deterrent on Israel’s northern frontier.

In Gaza, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been similarly enhanced by Iranian assistance. Technology transfers enabling the production of long-range rockets and suicide drones have provided these groups with the capacity to sustain recurring escalations. Such flare-ups ensure that Israel remains under permanent threat.

In Iraq, Iran relies on militias integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces. Functioning as extensions of the Revolutionary Guard, these groups target United States bases and threaten Israeli interests while embedding themselves within Iraq’s domestic political landscape. In Syria, Iran has constructed bases and weapons-transfer routes to supply Hezbollah. The frequency of Israeli airstrikes on convoys and depots underscores the strategic significance of this corridor.

In Yemen, the Houthis represent the newest extension of this axis. Originally a local movement, they have been transformed into a regional actor capable of launching Iranian-supplied drones and missiles against Israel and international shipping in the Red Sea. Their activity broadens the geographic map of threats beyond Israel’s borders and poses risks to global trade and energy flows from the Suez Canal to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

All of these groups share a structural dependency on Tehran and function as instruments of indirect warfare. Iran routinely denies responsibility for their actions, but financial records, training activities, and technological footprints consistently reveal its involvement. This proxy cover enables Tehran to maintain hostility while avoiding the full costs of direct war.

The burden of this strategy, however, is borne by the host societies. Lebanon is trapped in deep political and economic crisis under Hezbollah’s dominance. Gaza suffers repeated cycles of devastating conflict. Iraq remains politically paralyzed. Syria has become a battlefield for regional and international rivalries. Yemen endures one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. In all cases, ordinary populations carry the heaviest costs, while the regime in Tehran advances its regional design.

For Israel, the result is a multilayered security threat extending from the north, the south, the east, and even the distant south. This configuration leaves the country under a state of permanent siege. For the wider international community, the message is equally clear: Iran is not sustaining a limited bilateral feud, but deliberately widening the battlefield in ways that threaten the stability of the Middle East and the security of global commerce. The Axis of Resistance stands as the operational embodiment of an ideology that institutionalizes conflict until the underlying political structure in Tehran is fundamentally transformed.

The Twelve Day War and Its Geopolitical Impact

On 13 June 2025, the conflict between Iran and Israel emerged from the shadows. Israeli preemptive airstrikes against Iranian military and nuclear sites triggered a massive retaliatory campaign from Tehran. Within hours, Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones toward Israeli territory. Although Israel’s multilayered defensive systems—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow—intercepted a large portion, a significant number penetrated, inflicting damage on infrastructure and causing civilian casualties. For the first time, Israeli society experienced the scale of Iran’s strike capability.

Israel responded with extensive airstrikes and long-range missile attacks targeting bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Isfahan, Hamadan, and near Natanz. Explosions struck sensitive facilities, and Iranian media outlets vowed full retaliation. Over twelve days, thousands were wounded in both countries, hundreds were killed, and essential infrastructure was disrupted. Airports in Israel closed temporarily, while parts of Iran suffered interruptions in water and electricity supply. In parallel, a cyberwar unfolded, with Israel attacking Iranian communication networks and Iran attempting to disrupt Israeli financial systems.

International pressure escalated quickly. Washington provided Israel with defensive assistance while urging restraint. European governments warned of potential energy shocks, and Qatar together with Oman sought to mediate. By 24 June, a ceasefire was declared, though sporadic attacks persisted. Neither side claimed victory. Israel recognized Iran’s ability to pressure critical assets, while Iran showcased its arsenal for domestic consumption. Yet behind Tehran’s celebrations, the precision of Israeli strikes revealed significant vulnerabilities.

The war reverberated across the region. Hezbollah in Lebanon declared full alert, the Houthis in Yemen launched additional rockets, and Iraqi militias attacked United States bases, demonstrating that a direct Iran–Israel war mobilizes the broader proxy network.

The global energy market responded immediately, with oil prices surging amid fears of Gulf disruption. Europe, already strained by the Ukraine conflict, feared a renewed recession. The United States confronted the challenge of supporting Israel while avoiding another large-scale Middle Eastern war. Russia and China observed closely: Moscow saw an opportunity to divert Western attention, while Beijing feared instability in vital energy corridors.

The strategic outcome was fragile balance. Neither side achieved decisive victory, but both demonstrated the capacity to inflict serious harm. This precarious deterrence makes renewed conflict likely, with each future round potentially larger and more destabilizing.

A Strategic Deadlock with No Exit

The Twelve Day War underscored the paradox within the Islamic Republic. Ideological rigidity precludes meaningful retreat, yet continuation imposes unsustainable costs. The regime’s legitimacy is built on hostility toward Israel; abandoning this position would undermine its identity. Persisting, however, deepens Iran’s international isolation and economic decline. The result is a structural deadlock with no exit.

Three scenarios can be envisaged. First, continued controlled tension: Iran maintains pressure through proxies without crossing into full war. Yet control is imperfect; one miscalculation could trigger escalation. Second, renewed direct confrontation: Israel has signaled it will strike Iranian targets if red lines are crossed, raising the prospect of a clash that destabilizes the region and global economy by driving up energy prices, threatening shipping lanes, and provoking mass displacement. Third, internal erosion: economic crisis, corruption, and public dissent may gradually erode the effectiveness of the permanent-enemy narrative, weakening the regime’s foundations.

External actors add complexity. The United States guarantees Israeli security but resists another regional war. Europe fears economic fallout. Russia and China balance benefits of Western distraction against risks to energy stability. For Israel, the reality is stark: it faces a multi-front siege that cannot be dismantled without structural change in Tehran.

The global message is clear. The Islamic Republic is not a conventional state whose hostility can be moderated through diplomacy alone. Hostility toward Israel is structural. Expecting fundamental behavioral change is illusory. Risk management and contingency planning must replace hope.

Global Consequences and Lessons for the West

Though regional in origin, the Iran–Israel conflict has global consequences. Each escalation reverberates internationally. Oil and gas prices rise, supply chains are disrupted, and critical maritime routes such as Bab al-Mandeb and the Suez Canal are endangered. Europe, heavily dependent on energy imports, remains particularly exposed. Shipping disruptions risk paralyzing global trade, inflating costs, and provoking recession. Houthis armed with Iranian technology have already threatened commercial vessels, internationalizing the conflict. The security dimension extends beyond economics. U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria come under attack, while cyber operations attributed to Iran target energy grids and financial systems. Instability generates migration flows, straining Europe’s political and social systems.

The lessons for Western policymakers are clear. Israeli security is inseparable from global security; harm to one reverberates in the other. Half measures are insufficient against a flexible transnational proxy network. Only comprehensive strategies—targeted pressure, protection of energy corridors, and cyber resilience—can manage the risks. Engagement with a regime defined by enmity yields little; therefore, scenario-based planning and coalition deterrence remain essential.

Conclusion: The Unfinished Path of Conflict

Over four decades, hostility toward Israel has been woven into the political fabric of Iran. The drone strike on Ramon Airport in September 2025 was only one link in a long chain. The Twelve Day War of June 2025 proved that open confrontation is no longer taboo. The proxy web stretching from Lebanon to Yemen has widened the threat landscape, jeopardizing both regional stability and the global economy.

Deterrence is fragile. Israel can strike deep into Iran with precision, while Iran can overwhelm defenses with massed salvos. As long as the current structure in Tehran endures, hostility will not abate. The future points either toward gradual internal erosion or renewed explosion. In both scenarios, consequences extend far beyond Tehran and Tel Aviv.The Middle East walks a razor’s edge. Any spark risks igniting conflagration. For Israel, this is a daily condition; for the world, a warning. Stability and prosperity cannot be sustained apart from this conflict. The path remains unfinished, and the fire unresolved.